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INTRODUCTION

E

NFORCEMENT of environmental laws in the United States
is accomplished through the use of a complex maze of
civil, criminal and administrative remedies lodged within
numerous divisions, departments and elements of state, county
and local governments. As a consequence of the failure to
coordinate state environmental enforcement efforts, multiple
remedies have been inartfully utilized in numerous jurisdictions resulting in an ineffective "system" of environmental enforcement.' For example, in New Jersey, various
t

State Environmental Prosecutor of New Jersey.

'+ Assistant State Environmental Prosecutor of New Jersey.

1. For a discussion of structural and procedural difficulties in state and local

(47)
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forms of environmental remedies exist in numerous divisions
within five departments of NewJersey State government as well as
in the local police, fire, code enforcement and health departments. 2 Prior to 1990, no entity in the New Jersey government
was responsible for coordinating the use or prioritization of remedies, or the deployment of manpower or resources in the environmental enforcement activities of state, county and local
agencies. The problem of this "missing dimension" of coordination is inherent in government's piecemeal legislative response to
the continually evolving problems of the pollution of our water
3
and air and the destruction of our natural resources.
The traditional governmental approach for solving environmental protection problems can be characterized as "crisis response." This may relate to the fact that we, as a society,
continue to discover the problems created by our mishandling of
wastes and pollutants. In the environmental area, a crisis
emerges and legislation is proposed to solve the crisis. 4 It may

have civil, criminal or administrative enforcement aspects. The
legislation enacted usually establishes an environmental program
with general statutory goals, provides funding and, in many cases,
delegates the responsibility for developing and promulgating regulations to a state, county or local agency. In turn, the agency
promulgates the regulations and, through its own regulatory enforcement power or with the civil or criminal enforcement assistance of some other state, county or local agency, enforces the law.
environmental regulation enforcement, see Lynda L. Butler, State Environmental
Programs: A Study in Political Influence and Regulatory Failure, 31 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 823, 906 (1990) [hereinafter Butler, State Environmental Programs]. See also

Joel A. Mintz, Clear the Air, 21 ENVTL. L. 1543, 1547 (1991)("While some local
governments may be entirely equipped to take on the responsibilities of environmental enforcement, many others lack ample legal authority, well trained
professional enforcement staffs, and sufficient scientific and technical sophistication. These elements are all prerequisite to environmental enforcement
success.").
2. See infra notes 44-53 and accompanying text.
3. See generally Butler, State Environmental Programs,supra note 1, at 861-69

("[T]he ad hoc approach of the legislature has produced inconsistent management decisions and has led to a fragmented, inefficient and unclear administrative structure."). See, e.g., Frank P. Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability ("Superfund") Act of 1980, 8

COLUM.J. ENVTL. L., 1 (1982)(The Superfund legislation was "hurriedly put together.., in the closing days of the lame duck session of an outgoing Congress
.
Faced with a complicated bill on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, the House took
it, groaning all the way.").
4. See Butler, State EnvironmentalPrograms, supra note 1, at 861 (discussion of
state legislation "narrowly tailored to deal with the problems as they bec[o]me
crises").
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Ideally, the crisis has been successfully managed. Reflecting on
this phenomenon of "crisis response," it is understandable why,
over the years, the result has been a patchwork of programs and
remedies in multiple agencies in all levels of government, devoid
5
of centralized control or coordination.
Thus, the challenge facing New Jersey, and probably all other
states, is 1) to develop a "mechanism" to improve day-to-day
communication and coordination, 2) to provide for comprehensive enforcement planning which is holistic in scope and not artificially constrained by the limits of the authority of a single
governmental agency and 3) to ensure the commitment of personnel and resources for the effective and efficient resolution of
priority cases. 6 This paper will explore New Jersey's response to
this challenge - the recent creation of the Office of the State Environmental Prosecutor.
II.
A.

NEW JERSEY -

A CASE

STUDY

Background - Foundation of Environmental Enforcement

Realistic environmental laws with predictable and certain
civil, criminal and administrative penalties are the foundation for
effective environmental protection. Because compliance with environmental regulations is seemingly cumbersome and costly, it
cannot be left to the regulated community to comply with the law
voluntarily. The relevant statutes and regulations must have the
7
potential bite of enforcement penalties to ensure compliance.
As with most states, New Jersey's environmental laws are enforced through administrative, civil and criminal remedies. 8 All
5. Id. at 911 ("Promising environmental laws that have survived difficult
political battles become meaningless in the absence of effective regulatory enforcement."). EPA is also focusing on restructuring efforts. See, e.g., EPA Wants
Enforcement Office Reorganization to Yield Stronger Relationship With Regions, 20 Env't.
Rep. (BNA) 1716 (Feb. 2, 1990). See also EPA Sets Six Projects For Study as Part of
Enforcement 1990's Review, 20 Env't. Rep. (BNA) 1758 (Feb. 9, 1990) (EPA will
examine, inter alia, federal and state enforcement relationship and role of local
government).
6. Priority cases are cases involving chronic environmental offenders, syndicated criminals, or situations which pose an unusually serious threat to public
health or the environment, or which, for any other reasons, have become "high
profile."
7. See, e.g., F. Henry Habicht II, The FederalPerspective on Environmental Criminal Enforcement: How to Remain on the Civil Side, 17 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
10478 (Dec. 1987) [hereinafter Habicht, The Federal Perspective on Environmental
Criminal Enforcement] ("[E]xperience has shown that in the absence of consistent
enforcement, [violators] have undue incentives to gain competitive advantage
through noncompliance.").
8. See, e.g., Wendy E. Wagner, Liabilityfor Hazardous Waste Cleanup:An Exami-
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three serve necessary but somewhat different functions. A reasonable and realistic administrative enforcement program is essential to secure broad-based environmental compliance because
it is best suited to deal en masse with generalized program requirements. The use of easily administered fines and penalties
sets the general parameters of the enforcement program. 9 Civil
enforcement is more case specific. It brings to bear the general
civil remedies available in the state court system in the form of
prohibitory and mandatory injunctive orders, civil trial and penalty proceedings. Criminal enforcement is most effective in deterring the repeat offender, the syndicated criminal and others who
engage in crime for profit or otherwise consider civil penalties as
the cost of doing business.' 0 In addition, criminal prosecution,
with its potential for incarcerating individuals, sends a clear and
unmistakable message to the regulated community that the state
is serious about enforcing its environmental laws.
While each enforcement mode has the potential to be effective when used properly, each can be grossly ineffective and even
counterproductive if used in an untimely or uncoordinated manner. For example, in the event of a hazardous substance discharge, the immediate goal is to contain and stabilize any
environmental damage. This goal can best be achieved with the
polluter's "cooperation," proceeding in an administrative or civil
enforcement context. A criminal investigation initiated in an untimely fashion, however, thwarts such cooperation and may undermine the immediate success of stabilization attempts. Thus, in
such a setting, civil or administrative enforcement techniques are
nation of New Jersey's Approach, 13 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 245 (1989) (examining
New Jersey's tough new regulatory approach embodied in the Environmental
Cleanup Responsibility Act (ECRA)). For a general discussion of state implementation of environmental enforcement legislation, see DANIEL P. SELMI &
KENNETH A. MANASTER, STATE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, Sec. 16 (2d ed. 1991) [hereinafter Selmi & Manaster, State Environmental Law].
9. See Selmi & Manaster, State Environmental Law, supra note 8, at Sec. 16.04
("The various methods of administrative enforcement available to [state] environmental agencies occupy a heirarchy from the proverbial 'slap on the wrist' to
the ultimate sanction of a permit revocation that puts the defendant out of
business.").
10. See generally, Roger R. Marzulla & Beth L. Kappel, Nowhere to Run, Nowhere to Hide: Criminal Liabilityfor Violations of Environmental Statutes in the 1990's,
16 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 201, 216 (1991) (Prison sentences and heavy criminal
fines provide "a powerful incentive to voluntarily comply with the environmental laws."). See also Habicht, The Federal Perspective on Environmental Criminal Enforcement, supra note 7, at 10478 ("[T]he successful businesses of the future will
be those that recognize the significance of the civil and criminal sanctions now
prescribed for environmental violations and make efforts through compliance to
avoid prosecution.").
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initially more appropriate. On the other hand, civil and administrative enforcement tends to be ineffective when used against the
repeat offender or members of organized crime."l Matching and
sequencing the appropriate enforcement mechanism to the particular case is, therefore, essential to the effective enforcement of
environmental laws and policies.
For instance, the mere presence and periodic interaction of
the criminal justice system, in appropriate cases, enhances the
credibility of the broad-based administrative enforcement program. No longer does the regulated community view the regulatory inspector as having limited power and ineffective authority.
A series of timely criminal prosecutions apprises the regulated
community that ignoring the regulatory inspector carries with it
the certain prospect of more heavy-handed criminal prosecution,
including criminal search warrants, the grand jury subpoena, indictment and the potential for incarceration.' 2 Administrative enforcement, viewed in this context, is imminently more effective in
ensuring broad-based compliance.
Matching and sequencing the appropriate enforcement
mechanism(s) to the appropriate case is not only more effective, it
is also more efficient since resources are not wasted on unproductive endeavors. At a time when government is reassessing its
commitment of resources and its expenditure of tax dollars, it is
only fitting that governmental institutions work to ensure that
personnel and resources are utilized in the most effective and effi3
cient manner.'
11. See generally, Selmi & Manaster, State Environmental Law, supra note 8, at
Sec. 16.06 ("[A]gency enforcement efforts almost always are initially geared toward cooperative solutions, with the agency's posture becoming increasingly aggressive only after repeated instances of disregard for its orders."). See also,
Habicht, The FederalPerspective on Environmental CriminalEnforcement, supra note 7,
at 10480. Among the factors prosecutors examine in deciding whether to proceed with a criminal prosecution are: (1) the harm caused by a violation; (2) the
economic gain to the violator; and (3) whether the violations were repeated.
12. See Habicht, The Federal Perspective on Environmental Criminal Enforcement,
supra note 7, at 10479. The author noted the following:
The government's increased resort to criminal enforcement of the environmental laws has one principal, overarching goal: deterrence. The
stigma that attaches to a criminal conviction and the dislocation inherent in actual incarceration combine to make the threat of criminal prosecution a major tool in obtaining greater compliance with the nation's
environmental laws.
Id.
13. See, e.g., Consolidation of Environmental Agencies Expected to Resurface in
Budget Package, 22 Env't. Rep. (BNA) 568 (July 5, 1991) (proposal under consideration in Texas would consolidate several state agencies into single Department of the Environment).
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In order to understand the full potential of a coordinated enforcement initiative, it is necessary to survey the scope of the

tools provided by the key criminal, civil and administrative enforcement statutes. These tools are the foundation of any environmental enforcement program.
1.

Criminal Enforcement

It is essential that the threat of incarceration be a sure and
present risk for a willful disregard of appropriate environmental
statutes. In New Jersey, the most potent weapon is Section
2C:17-2 of the Code of Criminal Justice, 14 which classifies the
knowing or purposeful release or abandonment of hazardous
waste, toxic pollutants or other "harmful or destructive substance[s]" as a second degree crime' 5 under which it is presumed
that a convicted person will be incarcerated for five to ten years.16
14. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:17-2 (West 1982 & Supp. 1991).
15. Section 2C: 17-2a of the New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice reads as
follows:
(1) A person who, purposely or knowingly, unlawfully causes ... [the]
release or abandonment of... any... harmful or destructive substance
commits a crime of the second degree.
(2) A person who, purposely or knowingly, unlawfully causes a hazardous discharge required to be reported pursuant to the "Spill Compensation and Control Act," P.L.1976, c.141 (C.58:10-23:11 et seq.) or any
other rules and regulations adopted pursuant thereto, or who, purposely or knowingly, unlawfully causes a release or abandonment of
hazardous waste as defined in section 1 of P.L. 1976, c.99 (C. 13:1 E-38)
or a toxic pollutant as defined in section 3 of P.L.1977, c.74 (C.58:OA3) commits a crime of the second degree. Any person who recklessly
violates the provisions of this paragraph is guilty of a crime of the third
degree. The provisions of N.J.S. 2C: 1-6 to the contrary notwithstanding, a prosecution for a violation of the provisions of this paragraph
shall be commenced within five years of the date of the discovery of the
violation.
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:17-2a(l) to -2a(2) (West 1982 & Supp. 1991). Until the
recent amendment to the New Jersey Water Pollution Control Act, N.J. STAT.
ANN. §§ 58:10A-1 to -20 (West 1982 & Supp. 1991), by the Clean Water Enforcement Act of 1990, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 58:10A-I to -20 (West Supp. 1991),
section 2C:17-2a was the only New Jersey statute that classified an environmental crime as a second degree offense.
16. Section 2C:43-6a of the New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice reads as
follows:
a. Except as otherwise provided, a person who has been convicted of
a crime may be sentenced to imprisonment as follows:
(1) In the case of a crime of the first degree, for a specified term of
years which shall be fixed by the court and shall be between 10
years and 20 years;
(2) In the case of a crime of the second degree, for a specified term
of years which shall be fixed by the court and shall be between five
years and 10 years;
(3) In the case of a crime of the third degree, for a specified term
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Since successful prosecutions under this statute usually result in
jail time, the threat of criminal prosecution under this provision is
a successful deterrent.
In addition, this statute also provides that the "reckless" release or abandonment of hazardous waste, toxic pollutants or
7
other harmful or destructive substances is a third degree crime'
in which a conviction may result in imprisonment for three to five
years.' 8 These criminal provisions are particularly effective because they are not limited to one form of pollution, but can be
used for the release or abandonment of any "harmful or destructive substance."19
In April 1990, the Clean Water Enforcement Act 20 amended
New Jersey's Water Pollution Control Act 2 ' to include an expanded range of criminal provisions. 22 The base provision
of years which shall be fixed by the court and shall be between
three years and 5 years;
(4) In the case of a crime of the fourth degree, for a specified term
which shall be fixed by the court and shall not exceed 18 months.
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:43-6a(1) to -6a(4) (West 1982 & Supp. 1991).
17. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:17-2a(2).
18. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-6a(3).
19. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:17-2a. While such broad provisions may be vulnerable to overkill, criminal prosecutions under this statute are tempered by the
general penal law proscription against "de minimus" prosecutions.
20. Clean Water Enforcement Act of 1990, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 58:1OA-1 to 20 (West Supp. 1991).
21. Water Pollution Control Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 58:1 OA- 1 to -20 (West
1982 & Supp. 1991).
22. The criminal provisions of the amended Water Pollution Control Act
provide as follows:
(1)(a) Any person who purposely, knowingly, or recklessly violates this
act, and the violation causes a significant adverse environmental effect,
shall, upon conviction, be guilty of a crime of the second degree, and
shall ... , be subject to a fine of not less than $25,000 nor more than
$250,000 per day of violation, or by imprisonment, or by both. (b) As
used in this paragraph, a significant adverse environmental effect exists
when an action or omission of the defendant causes: serious harm or
damage to wildlife, freshwater or saltwater fish, any other aquatic or
marine life, water fowl, or to their habitats, or to livestock, or agricultural crops; serious harm, or degradation of, any ground or surface
waters used for drinking, agricultural, navigational, recreational, or industrial purposes; or any other serious articulable harm or damage to,
or degradation of, the lands or waters of the State, including ocean waters subject to its jurisdiction ....
(2) Any person who purposely, knowingly, or recklessly violates this
act, including making a false statement, representation, or certification
in any application, record, or other document filed or required to be
maintained under this act, or by falsifying, tampering with, or rendering inaccurate any monitoring device or method required to be maintained pursuant to this act, or by failure to submit a monitoring report,
or any portion thereof, required pursuant to this act, shall upon convicPublished by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1992
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designates any purposeful, knowing or reckless violation of the
Water Pollution Control Act as a third degree crime. 23 Where a
person acts only with criminal negligence, however, the statute
reduces the crime to the fourth degree,2 4 whereby a convicted
party may be subjected to a maximum period of eighteen months
incarceration. 2 5 In the event a person acts purposely, knowingly
or recklessly and causes a "significant adverse environmental ef27
fect," 26 the criminal penalty is elevated to the second degree.
For the first time in New Jersey, an environmental crime is enhanced a degree because of the impact on the environment rather
than on a more sophisticated mens rea. The Act also creates a first
degree environmental crime for the knowing discharge without a
permit or in violation of a permit condition, whereby a person
knowingly places another person in imminent danger of death or
serious bodily injury.2 8 Conviction under this provision results in
the presumption of incarceration, for ten to twenty years.2 9 This
tion, be guilty of a crime of the third degree, and shall ... ,be subject
to a fine of not less than $5,000 nor more than $75,000 per day of
violation, or by imprisonment, or by both.
(3) Any person who negligently violates this act, including making a
false statement, representation, or certification in any application, record, or other document filed or required to be maintained under this
act, or by falsifying, tampering with, or rendering inaccurate any monitoring device or method required to be maintained pursuant to this act,
or by failing to submit a discharge monitoring report, or any portion
thereof, required pursuant to this act, shall upon conviction, be guilty
of a crime of the fourth degree, and shall ...,be subject to a fine of not
less than $5,000 nor more than $50,000 per day of violation, or by imprisonment, or by both.
(4) Any person who purposely or knowingly violates an effluent limitation or other condition of a permit, or who discharges without a permit,
and who knows at that time that he thereby places another person in
imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury ...,shall, upon conviction, be guilty of a crime of the first degree, and shall ...,be subject
to a fine of not less than $50,000 nor more than $250,000, or, in the
case of a corporation, a fine of not less than $200,000 nor more than
$1,000,000, or by imprisonment, or by both.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10A-10f (West 1982 & Supp. 1991).
23. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10A-10f(2).
24. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10A-10f(3).

25. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-6a(4) (West 1982 & Supp. 1991). For the applicable text of section 2C:43-6a(4), see supra note 16.
26. A "significant adverse environmental effect" is defined in N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 58:1OA-1Of(l)(b). For the applicable text of this section, see supra note
22.
27. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10A-10f(l)(a).
28. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10A-10f(4).

29. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-6a(1) (West 1982 & Supp. 1991). For the applicable text of this section, see supra note 16.
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is the only environmental first degree crime for the State of New
Jersey.
In addition to these sample statutes, there are numerous
other environmental statutes which criminalize pollution.3 0 Another critical statutory tool is the tolling of the usual five year statute of limitations until the date of discovery. 3 ' This is critical for
environmental enforcement because environmental crimes often
are not discovered until years after the incident.
2.

Civil Enforcement

The civil tools and remedies, although not as coercive a deterrent as the criminal sanctions, are also dramatically important.
The Deputy Attorneys General within the Department of Law and
Public Safety's Division of Law3 2 have a significant number of civil
remedies provided by the various statutes, in addition to the usual
forms of common law equitable relief. Through civil enforcement, the State has the power to obtain temporary injunctions to
remedy emergencies, and the power to recoup the costs of
30. New Jersey's environmental crimes statutes include statutes which
criminalize the failure to use the required manifest in connection with the shipment of hazardous waste, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1E-9i (West 1991), or the shipment of regulated medical waste, NJ. STAT. ANN. § 13:1E-48.20i (West 1991),
regardless of the perpetrator's intent.
In addition to the usual array of Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA) formatted provisions, New Jersey statutes criminalize the purposeful,
knowing or reckless violation of the Air Pollution Control Act, N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 26:2C-1 to -36 (West 1987 & Supp. 1991), or any code, rule, regulation, administrative or court order issued pursuant thereto, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2C-19f
(West Supp. 1991); the intentional dumping of materials into ocean waters, N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 58:10A-49a (West 1982 & Supp. 1991); the purposeful, knowing
or reckless causing of widespread injury (defined generally as serious bodily injury to ten or more people, or damage to ten or more habitations, N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2C:17-2e (West 1982 & Supp. 1991)), N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:17-2a(1), 2b (West 1982 & Supp. 1991); the purposeful, knowing, reckless or negligent
disposal or storage of regulated medical waste, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:1E-48.20g
to -48.20h (West 1991); the knowing violation of the provisions of the Solid
Waste Utility Control Act, NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 48:13A-1 et seq., at -12 (West
Supp. 1991); and the willful or negligent violation of the Freshwater Wetlands
Protection Act, NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:9B-1 et seq., at -21f (West 1991).
31. NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:17-2a(2) (West 1982 & Supp. 1991).
32. The New Jersey State Attorney General is the head of the Department
of Law and Public Safety. Both the Division of Law, which handles all civil suits
on behalf of the State, and the Division of Criminal Justice, which handles all
criminal actions on behalf of the State, are housed within the Department of Law
and Public Safety. See NJ. STAT. ANN. § 52:17B-3 (West 1986) (establishing Division of Law within Department of Law and Public Safety); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 52:17B-99 (West 1986) (establishing Division of Criminal Justice within Department of Law and Public Safety).
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1992
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remediation, investigation and litigation. 33 For example, the
Solid Waste Management Act 3 4 establishes a comprehensive civil
enforcement scheme illustrating many of the available civil remedies.3 5 Section 9d of the Solid Waste Management Act provides
an action in the State Superior Court for injunctive or other relief
"including the appointment of a receiver for any violation of this
act, or of any code, rule or regulation promulgated, permit issued
or solid waste management plan adopted pursuant to this act and
36
said court may proceed in the action in a summary manner."
Under the statute, this relief may include, singly or in
combination:
a. A temporary or permanent injunction;
b. Assessment of investigation and litigation costs;
c. Assessment of state remediation costs;
d. Assessment of compensatory damages for loss or destruction of natural resources and other actual
37
damages.
3.

Administrative Enforcement

Finally, administrative enforcement has its own tools and
remedies. For example, the Department of Environmental Protection and Energy (DEPE) has the power to require the registration and filing of reports by persons engaged in operations which
may cause pollution.3 8 DEPE may enter and inspect any building
to investigate suspected pollution or to ascertain compliance with
33. See, e.g., Solid Waste Management Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:IE-I to 48, at -9d (West 1991); Freshwater Wetlands Protection Act, N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 13:9B-1 et seq., at -21c (West 1991); and Water Pollution Control Act as
amended by the Clean Water Enforcement Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 58:10A-1 to 20, at -10c (West 1982 & Supp. 1991).
34. Solid Waste Management Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:lE-1 to -48 (West
1991).
35. Id. at § 13:lE-9d.
36. Id.
37. Id. at §§ 13:lE-9d(l) to (4). The civil remedies of the Water Pollution
Control Act, as amended by the Clean Water Enforcement Act, mirror those of
the Solid Waste Management Act, but include the added remedy of assessing the
actual amount of any economic benefit accruing to the violator, which may include the amount of any savings realized from avoided capital and non-capital
costs, benefits from competitive market advantage, or any other benefits resulting from the violation. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10A-1 to -20, at -10c(5) (West
1982 & Supp. 1991). Moreover, the Freshwater Wetlands Protection Act adds
the remedy that the violator restore the site to the maximum extent practicable
and feasible. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:9B-1 et seq., at -21c(5) (West 1991).
38. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1D-9c (West 1991).
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codes, rules and regulations.3 9 These general enforcement powers are supplemented by powers created under specific environmental statutes. For example, the Solid Waste Management Act
gives DEPE the enforcement power to issue an administrative order directing a person found in violation to come into compliance 40 and to issue a civil administrative penalty ranging from
$10,000 to $50,000 per violation. 4 1 In addition, the Spill Compensation and Control Act 4 2 provides that DEPE can sue a responsible party for treble damages for failing to respond to a
43
cleanup directive.
B.

Problems Facing New Jersey

Despite the strong laws which were on New Jersey's books,
enforcement was still problematic. Essentially, there were three
problems facing New Jersey: (1) an inability to coordinate enforcement among agencies in a particular case; (2) an inability to
engage in comprehensive environmental enforcement planning
not constrained by the limits of authority of a single governmental agency; and (3) an inability to identify and insure the commitment of personnel and resources for the effective and efficient
resolution of high priority cases. The cause and nature of each of
these problems will be discussed below.
1. Lack of CoordinationAmong Agencies
As a result of the "piecemeal" development of the environmental enforcement programs in the context of crisis management, New Jersey's environmental laws are fragmented. Each
environmental law was passed to solve a crisis and not as part of a
comprehensive scheme for environmental enforcement. As a result, no one agency has had responsibility for enforcing or coordinating the enforcement of environmental laws. Rather, many
agencies have been involved. For example, DEPE, through its di39.
40.
41.
42.
-23.11z
43.

Id. at § 13:1D-9d.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:lE-9b(l) (West 1991).
Id. at §§ 13:1E-9b(3), -9e.
Spill Compensation and Control Act, N.J. STAT.
(West 1982 & Supp. 1991).
Id. at § 58:10-23.11 f(a).

ANN.

§§ 58:10-23.11 to
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visions, regulates air 4 4 and water pollution, 4 5 solid waste, 46 recycling, 4 7 and regulated medical 4 8 and hazardous waste. 49 The
Department of Health does complementary regulating in the regulated medical waste 50 and asbestos removal areas. 5 1 The Department of Labor also regulates asbestos licensing and
removal. 5 2 In addition, the Department of Law and Public Safety,
through the Divisions of Law and Criminal Justice, plays a vital
role in environmental enforcement by representing the agencies
in all civil and administrative court proceedings and through its
53
criminal investigation and prosecution efforts.
Although there is a significant commitment of resources allocated to environmental enforcement, prior to 1990 there was no
mechanism to match the peculiar resources and remedial tools,
personnel or information to demands that crossed department
and division lines. This was occasionally accomplished on a
"catch as catch can" basis dependent on the professionalism, motivation and "people skills" of the operatives. It was the excep-

tion and not the rule.
In addition to the lack of coordination among departments,
there was also a lack of coordination between civil and criminal
enforcement. For example, at times within the Department of
Law and Public Safety, the Division of Law would be pursuing a
44. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1D-18 (West 1991) (transfering responsibilities of
Clean Air Council, as enumerated in Air Pollution Control Act, N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 26:2C-1 to -36 (West 1987 & Supp. 1991), to Department of Environmental
Protection and Energy).
45. See, e.g., Water Pollution Control Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 58:10A-1 to 20, at -5 (West 1982 & Supp. 1991) (granting Department of Environmental
Protection and Energy power to regulate water pollution).
46. See, e.g., Solid Waste Management Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:IE-1 to 48, at -4 (West 1991) (granting Department of Environmental Protection and
Energy power to regulate solid waste collection and disposal).
47. See Clean Communities and Recycling Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:1E-92
to -99.43, at -96.1 (West 1991).
48. See Comprehensive Regulated Medical Waste Management Act, N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 13:1E-48.1 to -48.28, at -48.5 (West 1991) (requiring Department of Environmental Protection and Energy to consult with Department of
Health in promulgating rules and regulations governing disposal of regulated
medical waste).
49. See, e.g., Major Hazardous Waste Facilities Siting Act, N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 13:1E-49 to -91, at -55.3 (West 1991).
50. See supra note 48.
51. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:5A-32 to -42 (West 1988) (Department of
Health works with Department of Labor in regulating asbestos licensing and
removal).
52. Id.
53. See supra note 32.
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matter in the civil court system, when, unknown to them, the Division of Criminal Justice was developing the matter on a cross theory of prosecution. Ultimately, the criminal and civil interests
would clash and perhaps jeopardize the success of both investigations. On the other hand, in order to protect the integrity of the
evidence developed in parallel proceedings, it may be necessary
to construct a "Chinese" wall. For example, the secrecy of the
Grand Jury must be maintained. Therefore, the "Chinese" wall
must ensure that nothing discovered during the Grand Jury proceeding is shared with the civil investigation. Moreover, civil investigators may only share information with criminal investigators
if the civil investigation is a good faith investigation and not a
ploy to circumvent the constitutional mandates of the Fifth
Amendment 5 4 and Miranda55 protections. These concerns can
only be addressed if someone is able to recognize the need and
facilitate the necessary coordination.
Although coordination between civil and criminal investigations has always been desirable for many reasons, including the
aforementioned, it is now crucial to avoid the potential double
jeopardy issue formulated in United States v. Halper.5 6 In Halper,
the defendant was convicted of sixty-five counts of violating the
54. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The sharing of information between civil and
criminal investigators may implicate the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination where the civil investigation is not conducted in good faith. See,
e.g., United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57-58 (1964). In Powell, the Court held
that, prior to a recommendation for criminal prosecution to the Department of
Justice, the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") must use its summons authority in
good faith. 379 U.S. at 57-58. In doing so, the Court announced several elements of a good faith exercise of civil investigative powers:
[The IRS] must show that the investigation will be conducted pursuant
to a legitimate purpose, that the inquiry may be relevant to the purpose, that the information sought is not already within the Commissioner's possession, and that the administrative steps required by the
[IRS] Code have been followed .... [A] court may not permit its pro-

cess to be abused. Such an abuse would take place if the summons had
been issued for an improper purpose, such as to harass the taxpayer or
to put pressure on him to settle a collateral dispute, or for any other
purpose reflecting on the good faith of the particular investigation.
Id. In United States v. LaSalle National Bank, the U.S. Supreme Court said that
another improper purpose which the IRS may not pursue in good faith with a
summons is to gather evidence solely for use in a criminal investigation. 437
U.S. 298, 314-17 (1978).
55. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination requires that suspects in criminal investigations be
fully apprised of their constitutional rights before interrogation or questioning
by police).
56. 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
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criminal false-claims statute 5 7 and sentenced to imprisonment for
two years and fined $5,000.58 The Government then sued the de-

fendant under the civil False Claims Act 59 and sought the prescribed civil penalty of $130,000.60 The Supreme Court held that
the defendant was not subject to the civil penalty under the
double jeopardy clause if the civil penalty is not remedial, but
61
rather is a deterrent or is for retribution.
While Halper is limited to the double jeopardy issue in which
criminal penalties were imposed prior to civil litigation, other
courts have held that the Halper principle applies when civil penalties are imposed prior to criminal prosecution. For example, in
New Jersey, the Appellate Division of the Superior Court held
that if civil penalties were imposed as a punitive measure, the
State would be barred from criminally prosecuting the defendant
62
under the double jeopardy clause.
This interpretation is not limited to New Jersey. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit observed, without deciding the issue, that the Halper principle applied where
civil penalties were imposed first. The court noted, "[a]lthough
in this case the civil penalty preceded, rather than followed the
criminal indictment, the Halper principle that civil penalties can
sometimes constitute criminal punishment for double jeopardy
purposes would seem to apply whether the civil penalties come
57. 18 U.S.C. § 287 (1988). The criminal false-claims statute prohibits
"make[ing] or present[ing] ... any claim upon or against the United States, or
any department or agency thereof, knowing such claim to be false, fictitious, or
fraudulent." Id.
58. 490 U.S. at 437.

59. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3731 (1988).
60. 490 U.S. at 438. At the time, the remedial provision of the civil False
Claims Act stated that a person in violation is "liable to the United States Government for a civil penalty of $2,000, an amount equal to two times the amount
of damages the Government sustains, because of the act of that person and costs
of the civil action." 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (1982), amended by 31 U.S.C. § 3729
(1988). "Having violated the Act 65 separate times, Halper thus appeared to be
subject to a statutory penalty of more than $130,000." 490 U.S. at 438.
61. 490 U.S. at 448.
[A] civil sanction that cannot fairly be said solely to serve a remedial
purpose, but rather can only be explained as also serving either retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment, as we have come to understand the term. We therefore hold that under the Double Jeopardy
Clause a defendant who already has been punished in a criminal prosecution may not be subjected to an additional civil sanction to the extent
that the second sanction may not fairly be characterized as remedial,
but only as a deterrent or retribution.
Id. at 448-49 (citations omitted).
62. State v. Darby, 587 A.2d 1309, 1315-16 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1991).
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before or after the criminal indictment. 63 Since a criminal or civil
investigation can be compromised under the Halper principle, but
may be avoided by a single proceeding, 64 a mechanism to identify
and coordinate potential civil/criminal conflicts is essential.
2.

Lack of Comprehensive Planning

Another problem endemic to this environmental framework
is the inability or unwillingness of any agency to transcend its own
jurisdictional limits in addressing holistic environmental enforcement solutions. Thus, an agency adopting regulations pursuant
to a legislative directive tends to focus myopically on what resources are available within the agency and not on what resources
are available throughout the state to address the particular issue.
This narrow focus precludes agencies from tapping the vast reservoir of expertise, information and tangible resources available in
other agencies. Moreover, this narrow focus causes a proliferation of duplicative and sometimes conflicting regulations because
agencies fail to consider other agency regulations. In addition,
this system increases the risk that all relevant areas are not
regulated.
3.

Inability to Expedite Priority Cases

Prior to the creation of the Office of the State Environmental
Prosecutor, there was no mechanism to ensure that priority cases
had the commitment of personnel, resources and coordination
necessary to effect the most efficient and effective disposition.
Consequently, cases involving the potential for substantial harm
to the environment have languished in the system. Since the civil
and criminal penalties and remediation costs in these cases can be
exorbitant and the legal issues complex, the defendants typically
have no motivation to resolve them. 65 Without a mechanism in
63. United States v. Mayer, 897 F.2d 1126, 1127 (11th Cir. 1990); see also
United States v. Marcus Schlos & Co., Inc., 724 F. Supp. 1123 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
64. 490 U.S. at 450-51. In Halper, the Court stated:
[The decision does not] prevent the Government from seeking and obtaining both the full civil penalty and the full range of statutorily authorized criminal penalties in the same proceeding. In a single
proceeding the multiple punishment issue would be limited to ensuring
that the total punishment did not exceed that authorized by the legislature. Finally, nothing in today's opinion precludes a private party from
filing a civil suit seeking damages for conduct that previously was the
subject of criminal prosecution and punishment.
Id. (citations omitted).
65. Due to the complexity of the legal issues involved in these cases and the
lack of coordination of state environmental enforcement efforts, cases may lan-
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state government to monitor and expedite the movement of these
cases, they are "lost" in the system. The harm is not merely the
delay in collecting fines or in meting out justice, but is the very
real damage to the environment caused by the delay in stabilization and remediation. Identifying and expediting priority cases
ensures that environmental concerns are addressed promptly
while these complex cases are litigated.
C.

New Jersey's Solution - Office of the State Environmental
Prosecutor

Despite the expenditure of significant tax dollars to fund this
commitment of personnel and resources in the various departments and divisions, the State is still confronting the continued
pollution of its air and water and egregious assaults upon its
beaches, rivers, lakes and other natural resources. Part of this
problem is attributable to the fragmented approach of the sundry
environmental statutes and regulations and the lack of coordination among the agencies. 6 6 Consider this "war" against polluters
in the context of a military campaign. The success of any such
campaign hinges on the coordination among the commanders of
the Army, Air Force, Navy, Coast Guard and Marines. This is
usually accomplished through the appointment of a single commander who oversees the strategy of war, and coordinates the
timing and use of weapons and personnel. As fundamental as this
concept is to a military campaign, it is universally disregarded by
the states in the "war" against polluters.
In response to this shortcoming, on January 25, 1990, the
then newly-appointed Governor, James J. Florio, issued Executive
Order No. 2.67 The Order established the position of the State
Environmental Prosecutor 68 in New Jersey government. Selected
guish in the system for years. This fact, combined with the consequent delay in
the ultimate collection of criminal penalties and remediation costs, creates a disincentive for a rational defendant, concerned with the time value of money, to
settle a case on a timely basis. Timely and effective reaction to such priority
cases by the enforcement authorities, however, will cause defendants to respond
quickly to environmental violations. See discussion infra part II.D.3.
66. See supra notes 1-5, 44-53 and accompanying text.
67. Executive Order No. 2 of 1990, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:17B-1 (West Supp.
1991).
68. Id. The title "Environmental Prosecutor" is somewhat of a misnomer
in the sense that the title "prosecutor," in common parlance, means an attorney
who investigates and prosecutes violations of the state's criminal laws. What
makes this prosecutor's position so unique - one that has been referred to as the
first of its kind in the world - is the fact that this environmental prosecutor is also
responsible for the investigation and "prosecution" of regulatory offenses and
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by the Governor and the Attorney General, and appointed by the
Governor, the State Environmental Prosecutor is currently an Assistant Attorney General and Director of the Office of the State
Environmental Prosecutor. The Office of the State Environmental Prosecutor is in, but not of, the Department of Law and Public
Safety, which is the cabinet-level department headed by State Attorney General Robert J. Del Tufo. The State Environmental
Prosecutor's responsibilities are two-fold. First, he is responsible
for the establishment of a comprehensive environmental enforcement program and second, he is responsible for the prosecution
69
of priority cases, whether civil, criminal or administrative.
At the time Order 2 was issued, Attorney General Del Tufo
and Steven J. Madonna, then the Environmental Prosecutor designee, conceptualized the new office around a management core
concept. Rather than attempt to create an additional bureaucracy
in the enforcement effort, or to transfer significant resources to
the State Environmental Prosecutor for the handling of priority
enforcement cases, it was deemed more efficient to establish the
Office of the State Environmental Prosecutor as a management
core to supervise, manage and coordinate all of the existing resources of State government that are components of the environmental enforcement program. The Office of the State
Environmental Prosecutor is currently comprised of seven Deputy Attorneys General, designated "Assistant State Environmental Prosecutors," who assist the State Environmental Prosecutor
in coordinating the various civil, criminal and administrative elements of the enforcement program. Specifically, the Assistant
Environmental Prosecutors coordinate and supervise the enforcement effort with DEPE and its Division of Solid Waste Management, the Divisions of Law and Criminal Justice within the
Department of Law and Public Safety, the State Police A-901 program, Marine Police activities and the State Department of
Health. The State Environmental Prosecutor is assisted by an Administrator of Investigations and two State Investigators, whose
responsibility it is to track the progress of the priority cases and
provide sufficient initial investigative assistance to enable the
State Environmental Prosecutor to evaluate the immediate needs
and direction of each case. Additionally, this group takes the inithe use of the civil laws for environmental enforcement purposes. As strange as
it may seem, it has taken until the year 1990 for any state to establish, in effect, a
unified commander for its "war" on pollution.
69. Id.
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tial report from applicants filing for cash awards under the Citizen
Information Awards Program. The Office of the State Environmental Prosecutor is also supported by an Executive Assistant, a
Secretarial Assistant, a senior secretary and two additional secretaries. With the exception of the State Environmental Prosecutor
himself and two of his Assistant Prosecutors, the balance of the
personnel have been drawn from within the existing cadre of state
government employees.
There is one essential prerequisite without which the Office
of the State Environmental Prosecutor could not function, and
that is the support of the Governor and Attorney General. Since
the State Environmental Prosecutor is a sub-cabinet level position, yet must interact with numerous divisions and departments
of state government, several of which are presided over by cabinet level commissioners, the Office of the State Environmental
Prosecutor could not be operated as envisioned without the express support of the Governor and Attorney General.
D.

New Jersey's Experience
1.

Improved Coordination

The State Environmental Prosecutor has undertaken numerous initiatives to improve the coordination and utilization of resources among agencies. First, the Office of the State
Environmental Prosecutor has been structured to facilitate coordination. Assistant State Environmental Prosecutors are assigned
to coordinate day-to-day management activities of the agencies as
previously described.
Second, the State Environmental Prosecutor has developed
protocols of operation for the various agencies. These protocols
ensure that the State Environmental Prosecutor is notified of all
"priority" cases and that non-priority cases are handled in a standardized manner. Protocols are currently in operation with the
local county prosecutors and the Division of Criminal Justice
within the Department of Law and Public Safety. Protocols are
being finalized with the Division of Law within the Department of
Law and Public Safety and DEPE. Informal protocols of operation have been or are being structured with the County Health
Officers, the Marine Services Bureau and the Solid and Hazardous Waste Investigations Unit within the New Jersey State Police,
and the State Department of Health.
Third, the State Environmental Prosecutor has commenced
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol3/iss1/3
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cross-media training for certain environmental enforcement
agency personnel. For example, solid waste inspectors from the
Board of Public Utilities and DEPE have received cross-training in
anticipation of the merger of the solid waste enforcement functions of the Board into those of DEPE; county health officers have
received environmental crimes training; and the Marine Services
Division of the State Police has been given more intensive environmental crimes training.
Fourth, the State Environmental Prosecutor has effectively
coordinated efforts between agencies to solve several problems
that plague the State. For example, the State Environmental
Prosecutor has coordinated the efforts of the NewJersey State Police and the Solid Waste Divisions of the Board of Public Utilities
and DEPE to check interstate solid waste haulers on the highways.
This initiative has resulted in the discovery of 1,727 violations.
Without the cooperation of the three agencies, none of these violations would have been detected because the regulators do not
have the state police power to stop motor vehicles, and the typical
state police road trooper does not have the expertise in the state
regulations to recognize violations of solid waste registration, vehicle markings and transportation requirements. The State Environmental Prosecutor has also initiated a "direct discharge"
initiative coordinating resources within the State Marine Police,
County Health Departments and DEPE to ferret out, cite and secure a termination of the direct discharge of "black and gray
water" into the rivers and bays of the state.
Fifth, the State Environmental Prosecutor has been responsible for developing long term solutions for coordination among
state agencies. Perhaps the most essential initiative has been the
computer project aimed at linking computers and data among the
divisions and departments of state government involved in environmental enforcement. Currently, every division and department has its own computer system and data base. The
departments have not been capable of accessing information regarding a particular company or case that another agency may
possess. In fact, departments have had difficulties communicating
between their own divisions. Consequently, one division within a
department may be targeting a company for environmental violations while another division has approved and possibly expanded
the permitted scope of the same company's environmental activities. The potential embarrassment and obvious inefficiencies in-
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herent in the present "system" will be eliminated when this
computer project has been completed.
2.

Policy and Planning

Since the State Environmental Prosecutor's focus is not limited to a particular agency but is comprehensive, he is able to consider creative solutions to environmental enforcement problems.
Currently, the State Environmental Prosecutor is reviewing the
present statutes and regulations within each enforcement area,
focusing on whether additional laws are needed and how coordination among the agencies can be achieved.
The State Environmental Prosecutor is transcending the
traditional boundaries of state government by reaching out to the
counties and municipalities within the State to enlist their involvement in the environmental enforcement effort. The State Environmental Prosecutor, working with the State County
Prosecutor's Association, has arranged for the training of legal
and investigative personnel in each of the twenty-one County
Prosecutors Offices. It is planned that the County Prosecutor's
Offices will form the hub of a county environmental enforcement
task force which will work with the county health officers, County
Emergency Response Units and county sheriffs. The protocol between the Office of the State Environmental Prosecutor and the
counties enables the State Environmental Prosecutor to review all
environmental cases that come to the County Prosecutor's attention and to determine with the County Prosecutor whether the
case should be prosecuted by the State or county in a civil, criminal or administrative mode. In addition, the State Environmental
Prosecutor arranges technical and legal support for the County
Prosecutor. Similar programs are being planned for municipal
prosecutors and police, health, code enforcement and fire safety
officers.
The State Environmental Prosecutor also recognizes the rich
untapped resource of citizen participation in the State. New
Jersey citizens are cognizant of the need to protect the environment but often feel frustrated by their own inability to be actively
involved. Just as local police departments across the country have
instituted town watches to deter crime, the State Environmental
Prosecutor is revitalizing river watches and similar programs to
deter pollution. Through these programs, the State Environmental Prosecutor will educate concerned citizens about the detection
of pollution crimes. For example, the Passaic River Coalition, a
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol3/iss1/3
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citizen's environmental group that protects the Passaic River, has
worked closely with the Office of the State Environmental Prosecutor to stop discharges of chemicals and other waste products
into the river and has instituted regular river cleanups. The State
Environmental Prosecutor has been working with the Coalition
and interested citizens to replicate their program in other areas of
the State.
Another innovative approach that the State Environmental
Prosecutor is developing is a partnership with environmentally
sensitive industries. Since the best environmental pollution policy is prevention, the State Environmental Prosecutor is developing voluntary compliance plans to assist industry in inspecting
and auditing their environmental procedures.
3.

Priority Cases

Perhaps the most frustrating and dangerous problem in environmental enforcement are the high profile environmental cases
that drag on in the court system for years. Because the stakes are
so high for the defendant and the litigation so complex, the cases
are often delayed, sometimes at the cost of the further degradation of the environment. By seizing priority cases, the State Environmental Prosecutor can evaluate the case and garner the
necessary personnel and resources to expedite the resolution of
the litigation.
This strategy was effective in a recent case. XYZ Corpora70
tion and Madison Industries in Old Bridge Township had been
70. "XYZ Corporation" is a fictitious name utilized as the result of an order
granted by the Superior Court of New Jersey, Apellate Division, to expunge the
records of two criminal indictments against XYZ Corporation. State v. [XYZ
Corp.], 557 A.2d 670 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989). In the first indictment,
XYZ and four of its principals were charged with purposely, knowingly and recklessly discharging a harmful substance, complicity to release the substances and
criminal mischief. State of N.J. v. [XYZ Corp.], State GrandJury Indictment No.
SGJ102-82-2 (December 1983). These charges related to allegations that XYZ
had discharged a substance known as "FM-2 HEELS" into sewerage systems
operated by the Middlesex County Utilities Authority ("MCUA") and Old
Bridge Township Sewerage Authority ("OBTSA"). See 557 A.2d 670, at 671. In
the second indictment, XYZ and three of its principals were charged with conspiracy to tamper with physical evidence, public records and a witness, and complicity. State of N.J. v. [XYZ Corp.], State Grand Jury Indictment No. SHJ 10282-2(2) (June 6, 1986). The State charged that XYZ had injected water into
monitoring wells installed on XYZ's property during the pendency of consolidated civil proceedings initiated in 1977, entitled City of Perth Amboy v. Madison
Industries, Inc., No. L-28115-76 and State of N.J., Dep't of Envtl. Protection v. [XYZ
Corp.], No. C-4474-76. See 557 A.2d 670, at 671.
On September 17, 1986, the State reached an agreement with XYZ and its
principals in which the State agreed to dismiss both indictments and XYZ agreed
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polluting the aquifer underlying the Runyon Watershed and ultimately threatening the City of Perth Amboy's water supply wells.
Although this pollution was discovered in 1974, litigation did not
produce the Court Order for remediation until 1981.71 Despite
the court's 1981 Order, continued litigation 7 2 delayed the implementation of the court ordered remediation to the point that not
a single spade of dirt was turned and not a single ounce of water
was pumped as of 1991. The plume of pollution had progressed
over the ten year period to the edge of the zone of influence of
the Perth Amboy wells. The State Environmental Prosecutor intervened and within six months removed the roadblocks to initi7
ate remediation, which commenced in January 199 1.
Of course, the State Environmental Prosecutor's goal is to
recognize priority cases early and prevent protracted delays in
their resolution. For example, on January 1, 1990, an Exxon inter-refinery pipeline ruptured discharging 567,000 gallons of
number two oil into the Arthur Kill. The State Environmental
Prosecutor worked with New Jersey Attorney General Del Tufo
and the New Jersey Divisions of Law and Criminal Justice, the
United States Attorney, the New York Attorney General, and the
Richmond County (New York) District Attorney to secure a guilty
plea from Exxon to a criminal negligence violation of the Federal
to establish a $250,000 trust for the purpose of cleaning and maintaining the
sewer connection lines of the MCUA to the OBTSA. State of N.J. v. [XYZ
Corp.], State GrandJury Indictment No. SGJ102-82-2 and No. SHJ102-82-2(2)
(dismissed Oct. 30, 1986). After these indictments were dismissed, XYZ sought
to have all records and information pertaining thereto expunged. See 557 A.2d
670.
71. City of Perth Amboy v. Madison Industries, Inc., No. L-28115-76, and
State of N.J., Dep't of Envtl. Protection v. [XYZ Corp.], No. C-4474-76 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. Oct. 10, 1981) (consolidated) (consent order requiring installation of groundwater recovery system and monitoring of groundwater recovery through use of monitoring wells).
72. An amended final judgment was entered on June 14, 1983, after a remand by the Appellate Division. City of Perth Amboy v. Madison Industries,
Inc., No. L-28115-76, and State of NJ., Dep't of Envtl. Protection v. [XYZ
Corp.], No. C-4474-76 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. June 14, 1983) (consolidated)
(consent order amending judgment of Oct. 10, 1981). Thereafter, XYZ moved
for an amendment to the June 14, 1983 judgment to permit development of an
alternative groundwater recovery program. City of Perth Amboy v. Madison Industries, Inc., No. L-28115-76, and State of N.J., Dep't of Envtl. Protection v.
[XYZ Corp.], No. C-4474-76 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. April 27, 1988) (consolidated) (consent order amending judgment of June 14, 1983).
73. The remediation commenced pursuant to the amended order of April
27, 1988. See supra note 72.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol3/iss1/3

22

Madonna and Breslin: The Environmental Prosecutor: New Jersey's Innovative Approach to

19921

THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROSECUTOR

Clean Water Act 7 4 on March 20, 1991. 7 5 A companion civil settlement which included civil fines, penalties and cleanup costs was
reached on June 14, 1991.76

Another benefit of prioritizing cases is preventing environmental catastrophes. A case in point is the White Chemical Corporation facility in Newark which had 8,000 rusting drums of
hazardous chemicals on site. The State Environmental Prosecutor learned of these conditions in April 1990. Within a month,
search warrants were executed which resulted in the State Grand
Jury returning a five count indictment 77 in December 1990,
against the company and its president and owner for second,
third and fourth degree crimes. 78 In addition, the State Environmental Prosecutor expedited the stabilization and remediation of
the site with DEPE and the federal Environmental Protection
79
Agency.
III.

CONCLUSION

New Jersey's experience with the Office of the State Environmental Prosecutor has been very positive. The State Environmental Prosecutor's efforts to coordinate the multiple agencies,
institute comprehensive environmental planning and expedite
priority cases has resulted in a more efficient and effective environmental enforcement program in New Jersey. Moreover, the
groundwork is being laid for continued cooperation among State,
county and local government agencies, citizens and even industry.
Although more time is needed to fully analyze the impact of the
Office of the State Environmental Prosecutor on environmental
enforcement, the early results are extremely positive.
74. Federal Water Pollution Control (Clean Water) Act, 26 U.S.C. §§ 12511387 (1988).
75. United States v. Exxon Corp., Criminal Action No. 91-131 (D.N.J.

March 20, 1991) (guilty plea entered).
76. United States v. Exxon Corp., No. CV-91-1003 (E.D.N.Y. June 14,

1991) (consent order entered). The consent order entered in the federal case
also served to settle a number of pending state court cases. See City of Elizabeth
v. Exxon Corp., No. UNN-L-05690 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. June 14, 1991);
State of N.J., Dep't of Envtl. Protection v. Exxon Corp., No. UNN-L-0387-90
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. June 14, 1991); City of New York v. Exxon Corp., No.

0398-90 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 14, 1991).
77. State of N.J. v. James W. White, State Grand Jury Indictment No.
SGJ271-90-1 (Dec. 7, 1991).
78. The State of New Jersey has since proceeded in the criminal case, but
no decision has yet been rendered. State v.James W. White, No. 90-12-00164-S
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. filed Dec. 7, 1990).
79. United States v. White Chemical Corp., Civil Action No. 90-3962
(D.N.J. Dec. 20, 1991) (consent order entered).
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